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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The titles of property purchased at tax sales are currently “under a federally 
created cloud”1 because there is not a universally applied standard to determine 
whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.2 As a result, it remains uncertain and difficult to predict 
whether tax sales may or may not be avoided because tax sales may be avoided 
if they are not for “reasonably equivalent value.” This “federally created cloud” 
raises the issue of whether there should be a presumption that lawfully conducted 
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 548, similar to the presumption provided in the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation “that 
‘reasonably equivalent value’ is the price received at [a mortgage] foreclosure 
sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure laws have been 
complied with.”3 The courts are increasingly split on this issue. 
The lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether tax sales are 
for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code 
causes uncertainty and other negative effects, including causing harm to the 
general welfare of society and states’ interests by significantly reducing the 
security of the title to real estate obtained through tax sales.4 Therefore, there 
should be a presumption created by the courts in applying 11 U.S.C. § 548 that 
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question 
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict 
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. Another solution 
is for the courts to apply BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to tax sales. 
Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in BFP, a “reasonably equivalent 
value” for property is the price in fact received at the forced sale, including tax 
sales, so long as all the requirements of the state’s forced sale laws have been 
complied with.5 
Part two of this Note discusses § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which sets 
forth the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid fraudulent transfers. Then, 
part three explains tax sales and the different procedures of tax sales employed 
in different jurisdictions. Part four discusses BFP v. Resolution Trust 
Corporation, a landmark case where the United States Supreme Court held that 
mortgage foreclosure sales may not be avoided if the sale complied with the 
 
 1. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 2. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 3. David P. Schwartz, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation: Critiquing the Supreme Court’s 
Method of Determining “Reasonably Equivalent Value” Within the Context of Bankruptcy 
Foreclosures, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 345, 363 (1995). 
 4. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 544. 
 5. See id. at 545; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
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state’s foreclosure laws.6 Next, part five discusses the definition of “value” in § 
548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Part six discusses the circuit split regarding 
whether tax sales can be avoided. In part seven, this Note discusses the negative 
effects caused by the lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether 
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value.” Finally, in parts eight and nine, 
this Note suggests potential solutions to address these negative effects, including 
applying BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to tax sales, or adopting a 
presumption that the prices received at tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent 
value” based on four elements. 
II.  SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
“Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548, sets forth the powers 
of a trustee in bankruptcy (or, in a Chapter 11 case, a debtor in possession) to 
avoid fraudulent transfers.”7 Section 548 permits the bankruptcy trustee to avoid 
transfers of property made within two years of the debtor’s filing of bankruptcy 
which were made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or 
which were constructively fraudulent.8 Further, transfers of property are 
considered constructively fraudulent and can be avoided if  
the trustee can establish (1) that the debtor had an interest in property; (2) that a 
transfer of that interest occurred within [two] year[s] of the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition; (3) that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer 
or became insolvent as a result thereof; and (4) that the debtor received “less 
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.”9 
 
 6. 511 U.S. at 545. 
 7. Id. at 535 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)). Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides 
in pertinent part: 
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an 
insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any 
obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment 
contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the 
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily— 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer 
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or 
obligation; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, 
or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 8. Id. 
 9. BFP, 511 U.S. at 535 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)). 
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III.  TAX SALES 
Delinquent property taxes are collected through tax sales.10 Generally, once 
property taxes are declared delinquent, most jurisdictions permit a private third 
party to purchase the local government’s lien for the taxes due at a tax sale.11 
The transfer of the tax lien is distinct from the sale of the underlying property 
that occurs at a tax foreclosure sale, which is another type of tax sale that this 
Note addresses.12 “Instead, what is transferred is the lien itself, vesting in the 
purchaser the right to enforce the lien in accordance with statutory 
procedures.”13 
“While all jurisdictions recognize a lien for property taxes, and all provide 
some mechanism for enforcement of that lien, the similarities end at that 
point.”14 A small amount of jurisdictions “functionally recognize a form of 
‘strict foreclosure’ in which a final date is established for payment of the taxes, 
and upon nonpayment the property is conveyed to the government” without a 
public or private sale.15 Alternatively, “in the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions enforcement of the property tax lien involves a sale of the lien itself, 
or of the underlying property, or sequential sales of first the lien and then the 
property.”16 In the jurisdictions that enforce the property tax lien with “one 
public sale, the sale is a sale of the underlying property, though the sale may be 
followed by a statutory right of redemption which requires subsequent 
termination by the passage of time or by affirmative action by the purchaser at 
the initial sale.”17 Alternatively, “[j]urisdictions that recognize two separate 
sales are first selling the lien, which is then enforced by a subsequent foreclosure 
sale.”18 
Furthermore, the public sale of a tax lien, or sale of the property itself, is 
conducted in three different ways, depending on the jurisdiction.19 “The 
predominant approach” is offering “the property at a public auction to the 
highest bidder, with a minimum bid equal to the aggregate amount of delinquent 
taxes, interest, penalties, and costs.”20 If the sale price exceeds the minimum bid, 
“the surplus is held for the benefit of subordinate claimants and the original 
owner.”21 In a minority of jurisdictions, the public auction is conducted by 
 
 10. Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 760 (2000). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 772. 
 15. Alexander, supra note 10, at 772. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 773. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 774. 
 20. Alexander, supra note 10, at 774. 
 21. Id. 
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awarding the property to the purchaser who is willing to purchase the smallest 
percentage of undivided interest in the real property.22 “[F]our states sell the 
property to the purchaser offering the lowest effective rate of interest pending 
redemption of the property by the owner[,]” in an effort to reflect market 
conditions and interest rates.23 
If a debtor files for bankruptcy shortly after a tax foreclosure, the debtor’s 
creditors become interested in avoiding the tax sale to recover lost wealth for the 
estate.24 The trustee can characterize the tax sale “as a constructive fraud, made 
while the debtor was insolvent, and for ‘less than a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange.’”25 If this argument prevails, the tax sale is avoided, and the estate 
recovers the property.26 The tax creditor would still retain a lien against the 
property for the amount of the tax debt, however, the tax creditor would lose to 
the estate the difference between the value of the property and the tax debt.27 
This Note addresses whether lawfully conducted tax sales, as described above, 
are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 548. 
IV.  BFP V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION 
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the issue of  
whether the consideration received from a noncollusive, real estate mortgage 
foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law 
conclusively satisfies the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that transfers of 
property by insolvent debtors within one year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition be in exchange for “a reasonably equivalent value.”28 
The petitioner in BFP “took title to a California home subject to a deed of trust 
in favor of Imperial Savings Association.”29 “After the petitioners were unable 
to continue payments and the loan was in default, the home was purchased for 
$433,000 at a properly conducted foreclosure sale” on July 12, 1989.30  
Later, in October 1989, the petitioner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code.31 “Acting as a debtor in possession, the petitioner filed 
a complaint in Bankruptcy Court to set aside the conveyance of the home . . . on 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Marie T. Reilly, The Case for the Tax Collector, 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 627, 
628 (Nov. 2009). 
 25. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)). 
 26. Reilly, supra note 24, at 628. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 511 U.S. 531, 533 (1994) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012)). 
 29. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 533). 
 30. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362; BFP, 511 U.S. at 533–34. 
 31. BFP, 511 U.S. at 534. 
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the grounds that the foreclosure sale constituted a fraudulent transfer under § 
548.”32 The petitioner alleged that the home was worth more than $725,000 at 
the time of the foreclosure sale, “and, thus, was not exchanged for a ‘reasonably 
equivalent value’ under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.”33 “The 
bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the purchaser[,]” and “[t]he 
bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the dismissal, holding that consideration 
received in a non-collusive and regularly conducted, nonjudicial foreclosure sale 
establishes ‘reasonably equivalent value’ as a matter of law.”34 The court of 
appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision, 
holding “that ‘reasonably equivalent value’ is the price received at the 
foreclosure sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure laws 
have been complied with.”35 
In BFP, the Court had to interpret the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” 
in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to determine whether the transfer of property 
in that case could be avoided as constructively fraudulent.36 The other elements 
of § 548 were not at issue before the Court in BFP.37 In interpreting § 548, the 
Court stated that “of the three critical terms ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ only 
the last is defined: ‘value’ means, for purposes of § 548, ‘property, or satisfaction 
or securing of a . . . debt of the debtor.’”38 The Court stated that “‘reasonably 
equivalent value’ is not to be equated either with fair market value or with fair 
foreclosure price.”39 Instead, the Court concluded that “a ‘reasonably equivalent 
value’ for foreclosed property[] is the price in fact received at the foreclosure 
sale, so long as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been 
complied with.”40 “Tax foreclosure sale statutes are often comparable to 
mortgage foreclosure sale statutes,” and as a result, “by analogy, BFP is 
arguably applicable to tax foreclosure sales.”41 “However, because the Supreme 
Court expressly noted that BFP did not necessarily apply to tax foreclosures, the 
applicability of BFP to tax foreclosures has been somewhat inconsistent and 
largely dependent on the protections afforded by applicable state tax foreclosure 
law.”42 This Note will provide clarification on the issue of whether lawfully 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362–63 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 534). 
 34. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 363. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 511 U.S. at 535; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 37. 511 U.S. at 535. 
 38. Id. at 535–36 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (2012)). 
 39. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 346. 
 40. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 41. John T. Gregg, A Federally Created Cloud: Reasonable Equivalent Value and Present 
Fair Equivalent Value in Tax Foreclosures and Forfeitures, 2007 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. 
L., PART II (Sept. 2007). 
 42. Id. 
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conducted tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance 
pursuant to § 548. 
V.  DEFINING “VALUE” IN SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
As mentioned earlier, in BFP, the United States Supreme Court was tasked 
with interpreting the ambiguous phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in 11 
U.S.C. § 548.43 The Court focused on the word “value,” as “[t]his [was] the word 
that Justice Scalia and the majority found to be ambiguous.”44  
“Congress used the word ‘value’ throughout the [Bankruptcy] Code to 
enable the bankruptcy judge to select different values for different purposes,” 
and thus “a fixed meaning [of ‘value’] was just what Congress wished to 
avoid.”45 The Court in BFP, however, held that the term “value” was ambiguous 
and set out to define it, and the Court searched outside the Bankruptcy Code for 
the definition of “value,” “utiliz[ing] history and interpretative ‘rules’ to find 
that the ‘value’ should be based on the individual state law’s foreclosure-sale 
market.”46 Therefore,  
the price paid at the foreclosure-sale market, which is controlled by varying state 
laws, will always be equivalent to the value of the property taken by the creditor. 
As a result, foreclosure sales complying with state law can never be fraudulent 
transfers. Because the mortgagee is frequently the purchaser at its own 
foreclosure, the amount of the mortgage debt will create the price ceiling under 
most state laws.47 
Justice Scalia supported this deference to state law with a historical 
argument and a reference to his view of the interrelationship between federal 
and state laws.48 Justice Scalia stated that “value” cannot mean fair market value 
because that phrase is used in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress 
specifically avoided the phrase fair market value in 11 U.S.C. § 548, and instead 
used “reasonably equivalent value.”49 Further, Justice Scalia stated that 
“[f]raudulent transfer law and foreclosure law enjoyed over 400 years of 
peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American jurisprudence until the Fifth Circuit’s 
 
 43. 511 U.S. at 535; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). It is important to note that Justice Scalia wrote 
the opinion of the Court in BFP, and when he finds ambiguity in statutory text, he “tends to part 
from his colleagues in his dismissal of most legislative history.” Janet A. Flaccus, Pre-Petition and 
Post-Petition Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax Sales and the Faulty Reasoning of the Supreme 
Court, 51 ARK. L. REV. 25, 30 (1998). Instead, Justice Scalia “looks to context in which the law 
was passed for guidance. . . . In BFP, he relied on history and interpretative tools to resolve the 
ambiguity.” Id. at 30–31. 
 44. Id. at 31. 
 45. Id. at 31, 33. 
 46. Id. at 33 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 540–46). 
 47. Flaccus, supra note 43, at 33. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 33–34. 
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unprecedented 1980 decision in Durrett [v. Washington National Insurance 
Company].”50 Justice Scalia stated that, to the Court’s knowledge, Durrett was 
the first instance where fraudulent transfer law was used to set aside a 
foreclosure sale.51  
The Court in BFP stated, “to say that the ‘reasonably equivalent value’ 
language in the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code requires a 
foreclosure sale to yield a certain minimum price beyond what state foreclosure 
law requires, is to say, in essence, that the Code has adopted Durrett or Bundles,” 
which were Fifth and Seventh Circuit cases, respectively, that held the 
foreclosure sales at issue were not for “reasonably equivalent value,” and thus 
avoidable.52 The Court continued, stating that Congress had the constitutional 
power “to disrupt the ancient harmony that foreclosure law and fraudulent 
conveyance law . . . have heretofore enjoyed. But absent clearer textual guidance 
than the phrase ‘reasonably equivalent value’—a phrase entirely compatible 
with pre-existing practice—we will not presume such a radical departure.”53 
Moreover, the Court in BFP supported a deference to state law in defining 
“value” by arguing that states have a strong interest in preserving real estate 
titles.54 Further, the Court stated that allowing mortgage foreclosure sales to be 
avoided would profoundly affect the state interest in preserving real estate titles 
by placing property purchased at mortgage foreclosure sales governed by state 
law under a federally created cloud.55 The Court argued that “questions 
concerning state land records are fundamental state rights on which only ‘clear 
and manifest’ federal statutes can impinge,” and “[b]ecause the word ‘value’ in 
section 548 was considered to be ambiguous, it could not meet the ‘clear and 
manifest’ standard.”56 The Court held that  
For the reasons described, we decline to read the phrase “reasonably equivalent 
value” in § 548(a)(2) to mean, in its application to mortgage foreclosure sales, 
either “fair market value” or “fair foreclosure price” (whether calculated as a 
percentage of fair market value or otherwise). We deem, as the law has always 
deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for 
foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long 
as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.57 
 
 50. BFP, 511 U.S. at 542. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 542–43. 
 53. Id. at 543. 
 54. Id. at 544. 
 55. BFP, 511 U.S. at 544. 
 56. Flaccus, supra note 43, at 40–41 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 544). 
 57. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545. 
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VI.  CIRCUIT SPLIT: COURTS ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER TAX SALES 
MAY BE AVOIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A. Extending BFP to Tax Sales 
1. Ninth Circuit: Tracht Gut, LLC v. L.A. County Treasurer & Tax 
Collector. 
In Tracht Gut, LLC v. L.A. County Treasurer & Tax Collector, the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether the rule in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation 
should be extended to California tax sales.58 In Tracht Gut, plaintiff-appellant 
Tracht Gut, LLC acquired two properties in 2012, and real property taxes had 
not been paid on either property since 2008.59 The two “properties were thus 
‘tax defaulted’ under California state law, and subject to the County’s power to 
sell.”60 “On August 31, 2012, the County served a Notice of Auction for a tax 
sale for each of the properties on all interested parties.”61 Then, “[o]n October 
22, 2012, the County Treasurer sold both properties at public auction.”62 Tracht 
Gut filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
on November 27, 2012, which was slightly more than one month after the tax 
sales on the properties.63 Tracht Gut asserted on its Schedule A that  
[a] disputed tax sale occurred on or about October 21, 2012. The sales price was 
far less than market value of this property. Debtor attempted to pay the taxes in 
full, which the [County] refused to take. As of the date of this petition, no Tax 
Deed has been recorded and Debtor disputes the validity of the transfer as an 
avoidable transfer.64 
Tracht Gut asserted that the tax sales were fraudulent transfers under 11 
U.S.C. § 548.65 Tracht Gut claimed that the properties were not sold for 
“reasonably equivalent values” at the tax sales as required by § 548, and thus the 
sales should be avoidable.66 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the rule 
in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, “that a prepetition mortgage 
foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with state law conclusively established 
that the price obtained at that sale was for reasonably equivalent value,” should 
also apply to California tax sales because tax foreclosure sales, like the mortgage 
 
 58. In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1149. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1148. 
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foreclosures at issue in BFP, are governed by state law, and have the same 
procedural safeguards under California law.67  
The specific procedural safeguards that led to the United States Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that mortgage foreclosures would yield “reasonably 
equivalent value” in BFP are that “‘[f]oreclosure laws typically require notice 
to the defaulting borrower, a substantial lead time before the commencement of 
foreclosure proceedings, publication of a notice of sale, and strict adherence to 
prescribed bidding rules and auction procedures,’” and the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that California tax sales have all of these procedural safeguards.68  
Under California law, the tax collector may sell tax-defaulted property that 
has not been redeemed after the property has been in default for three years for 
commercial real estate, and five years for residential real estate, and the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that these time periods provide a “‘substantial lead time.’”69 
California law also requires notices for tax sales comparable to the notices 
required under the mortgage foreclosure laws at issue in BFP.70 Additionally, 
California law requires all tax sales to be held at a public auction to the highest 
bidder, and that after a tax sale, the tax collector must execute a deed to the 
purchaser of the property.71 Further, California law provides that the tax deed is 
“‘conclusive evidence of the regularity of all proceedings from the assessment 
of the assessor to the execution of the deed.’”72 Moreover, “[t]he conclusive 
nature of the tax deed establishes that tax sales in California are conducted with 
‘strict adherence to prescribed bidding rules and auction procedures.’”73 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause California tax sales have the 
same procedural safeguards as the California mortgage foreclosure sale at issue 
in BFP, . . . the price received at a California tax sale conducted in accordance 
with state law conclusively establishes ‘reasonably equivalent value’ for 
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).”74 
2. Tenth Circuit: Kojima v. Grandote Int’l Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Grandote 
Country Club Co.). 
In Kojima v. Grandote Int’l Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Grandote Country Club 
Co.), the Tenth Circuit considered an ancillary proceeding to avoid a tax sale 
 
 67. Id. at 1152. 
 68. Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1153 (quoting BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 
542 (1994)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1153–54. 
 72. Id. at 1154 (quoting Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 3711). 
 73. Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1154 (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 542). 
 74. Id. 
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brought by the trustee of a Japanese entity involved in a Japanese insolvency.75 
The court found that similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer statute 
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548, “[a] transfer is not fraudulent under CUFTA [(the 
Colorado fraudulent transfer statute at issue in this case)] where an asset is 
acquired for ‘a reasonably equivalent value’ through a ‘regularly conducted, 
non-collusive sale, foreclosing on assets subject to a lien.’”76  
The Tenth Circuit extended BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to the tax 
sale in this case, finding that the tax sale, like the mortgage foreclosure sale in 
BFP, “constitutes a transfer ‘for reasonably equivalent value,’ even if the 
purchase price was below market value, as long as there is no evidence of 
collusion.”77 Further, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged BFP did not address a tax 
sale, however, it stated that BFP had been extended to tax sales in other cases.78 
The Tenth Circuit also stated that other courts had refused to extend BFP to the 
tax sale context, including its own Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in 
Sherman v. Rose, where the court “refus[ed] to extend BFP to a tax sale 
conducted under Wyoming statutes that ‘do not permit a public sale with 
competitive bidding.’”79 The court, however, stated that “the decisive factor in 
determining whether a transfer pursuant to a tax sale constitutes ‘reasonably 
equivalent value’ is a state’s procedure for tax sales, in particular, statutes 
requiring that tax sales take place publicly under a competitive bidding 
procedure.”80 In Grandote, the property was transferred “through a regularly 
conducted tax sale under Colorado law subject to a competitive bidding 
procedure.”81 Therefore, “[t]he Tenth Circuit found that the subject transfer 
[(through a tax sale)] was not fraudulent under the Colorado fraudulent transfer 
statute because the property was acquired through a regularly conducted, 
noncollusive sale.”82  
3. Fifth Circuit: T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In re T.F. Stone Co.). 
In T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In re T.F. Stone Co.), the Fifth Circuit 
considered “whether a peppercorn price received in a noncollusive, lawfully 
conducted tax foreclosure sale of the real property of a Chapter 11 debtor can 
 
 75. Gregg, supra note 41 (citing In re Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d 1146, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2001)). 
 76. Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-
104(2) (1991)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (quoting Sherman v. Rose (In re Sherman), 223 B.R. 555, 558–59 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
1998)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-11-101 
(2007), 39-11-108 (2005)). 
 82. Gregg, supra note 41 (citing Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152). 
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constitute ‘present fair equivalent value’ within the meaning of § 549(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 549(c).”83 In T.F. Stone, T.F. Stone Companies, 
Inc. acquired title to approximately five acres of land in Bryan County, 
Oklahoma.84 On July 3, 1989, Stone Companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
and listed the Oklahoma property in its schedule of assets at a value of $65,000.85 
Though Stone Companies did not pay ad valorem taxes on the Oklahoma 
property in 1989, it did not list Bryan County as a creditor in its bankruptcy, and 
it did not file notice of its bankruptcy in Bryan County.86 On October 1, 1990, 
the County Treasurer of Bryan County conducted a tax foreclosure sale of the 
property attempting to satisfy Stone Companies’ delinquent tax obligation, as 
authorized under Oklahoma law.87 No bids were made at the tax sale, and as a 
result, title to the property transferred to Bryan County.88 During the two years 
after Bryan County took title to the Oklahoma property, Stone Companies had a 
right to redeem the Oklahoma property by paying its outstanding tax debt.89 
Stone Companies did not exercise this right, and did not pay taxes on the 
property in 1990, 1991, or 1992.90 
On June 4, 1993, Bryan County conducted a tax resale of the property and 
sold it for $325, and this was used to satisfy Stone Companies’ delinquent tax 
debt.91 The sale terminated Stone Companies’ redemption right and eliminated 
Stone Companies’ remaining equity in the property.92 On October 21, 1993, 
Stone Companies sued in bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 549, seeking to 
void the effects of Bryan County’s acquisition of title to the Oklahoma property 
and subsequent resale as an unauthorized post-petition transfer.93 
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the county, holding 
that the price obtained at the county’s foreclosure sale was presumptively its 
present fair equivalent value.94 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
United States Supreme Court in BFP “expressly eschewed any consideration of 
the substantive value received in a forced-sale context and instead pinned the 
validity of the transfer on whether the forced sale was non collusive and 
 
 83. Matter of T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d 466, 467 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 §§ 3105, 3107 (2019)). 
 88. T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 467. 
 89. Id. (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 § 3113 (2019)). 
 90. Id. at 467–68. 
 91. Id. at 468 (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 § 3125 (2019) (providing for the resale of 
unredeemed properties after the two-year redemption period)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 468. 
 94. Marie T. Reilly, A Search for Reason in “Reasonably Equivalent Value” After BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (2005). 
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conducted in compliance with state law.”95 Further, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that “Congress may have meant ‘fair equivalent value’ in section 549 to mean 
something different than ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in section 548, but the 
court could not find a ‘meaningful difference’ between the two phrases,” 
supporting its decision to extend BFP in this case.96 The Fifth Circuit also 
supported its extension of BFP to this case by stating that deference should be 
given to state regulatory interests, as states have strong interests in ensuring 
security of the titles to real estate in mortgage foreclosure sales and tax sales of 
real property.97 
B. Declining to Extend BFP to Tax Sales 
1. Seventh Circuit: Smith v. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith). 
“In January 2016, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to rule directly 
on the issue of ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in a tax sale where the state tax sale 
laws did not include competitive bidding.”98 In Smith v. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 
the Seventh Circuit considered “whether compliance with state law for tax sales 
is sufficient to establish that the sale was for ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ or 
whether the debtor may try to set aside the sale under § 548(a)(1)(B).”99 The 
Seventh Circuit applied the general rule that a sale or other transfer of an 
insolvent’s property may be set aside as fraudulent if the transfer was for less 
than “reasonably equivalent value” to a lawfully conducted sale of real estate 
under Illinois property tax sale procedures.100  
The Seventh Circuit distinguished its holding from the holdings of the Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits,  
which held that tax sales conducted in compliance with state law establish 
reasonably equivalent value for purposes of § 548, noting that the tax sales in 
each of those cases were conducted in a similar manner to the foreclosure sale 
reviewed in BFP, while the case before it did not include the competitive-
bidding component found in BFP.101 
Further, in Smith, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, 
concurred with City of Milwaukee v. Gillespie, where the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that “‘a judgment of foreclosure, 
based solely upon delinquent taxes in a non-sale foreclosure proceeding, does 
 
 95. Id. at 283 (quoting T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 470 (emphasis added)). 
 96. Id. at 283. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Frederick F. Rudzik & Kristine H. Rudzik, Seventh Circuit Decision Might Impact State 
Property Tax Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 63 (May 2016). 
 99. 811 F.3d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 100. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)). 
 101. Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63. 
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not necessarily provide a property owner “reasonably equivalent value” for real 
estate without a public sale offering.’”102 Additionally, in Gillespie, the court 
stated, “if property is seized without a sale or competitive bidding, it cannot be 
presumed as a matter of law that ‘reasonably equivalent value’ was received by 
a debtor transferor because market forces were completely absent.”103  
Furthermore, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois stated that the defendant’s reliance on BFP was 
further hampered by the fact that the Illinois real estate tax sale process is not 
analogous to the Illinois mortgage foreclosure sale process. Unlike at a mortgage 
foreclosure sale, a debtor’s interest in the property is not sold at a tax sale; rather, 
only the delinquent taxes are purchased by the winning bidder, not the title to 
the property. The court in McKeever v. McClandon (In re McKeever), described 
the Illinois tax sale process as follows: “the only purpose of a tax sale is for the 
taxing authority to obtain payment of its delinquent taxes at the lowest cost of 
redemption. There is no correlation between the sale price and the value of the 
property. Therefore, it will be a rare case where the taxes paid at a tax sale will 
approximate the actual value of the property.”104 
The court continued, stating “[a]s a result of the Illinois tax statute, competitive 
bidding was not present at the time of the transfer to ensure that market forces 
were acting efficiently to create a fair value for the property transferred.”105 
Further, the court reasoned that a lack of competitive bidding and other 
procedures ensuring a fair value is received for transferred property is “a 
significant bar to adjudicating ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in a tax sale 
context.”106 Therefore, the United States Bankruptcy Court found “that BFP 
does not bar recovery by the Debtors under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code 
because the price received at the tax sale does not necessarily reflect a 
reasonably equivalent value for the underlying property.”107 
In Smith, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, 
holding that  
[u]nlike mortgage foreclosure sales and some other states’ tax sales, Illinois tax 
sales do not involve competitive bidding where the highest bid wins. Instead, 
bidders bid how little money they are willing to accept in return for payment of 
the owner’s delinquent taxes. The lowest bid wins, and the bid amounts bear no 
relationship to the value of the underlying real estate. We therefore agree with 
 
 102. In re Smith, 501 B.R. 843, 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing City of Milwaukee v. 
Gillespie, 487 B.R. 916, 920 (E.D. Wis. 2013)). 
 103. Gillespie, 487 B.R. at 920. 
 104. Smith, 501 B.R. at 847 (quoting McKeever v. McClandon (In re McKeever), 166 B.R. 
648, 650–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994)). 
 105. Smith, 501 B.R. at 847. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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the bankruptcy court, disagree with the district court, and apply the general rule 
of § 548(a)(1)(B).108 
2. Second Circuit: Clinton County Treasurer v. Wolinsky. 
In Clinton County Treasurer v. Wolinsky, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of New York considered an appeal arguing “that a valid 
pre-petition tax foreclosure proceeding and subsequent transfer of property to a 
[bona fide purchaser] is not the type of fraudulent conveyance contemplated by 
Bankruptcy Code § 548.”109 In Wolinsky, the property at issue was transferred 
on March 18, 2011 from the debtor to Clinton County through an in rem tax 
foreclosure proceeding Clinton County commenced after the debtor failed to pay 
$2,406.45 in property taxes in 2008 and 2009, and then failed to answer the 
foreclosure petition or pay the delinquent taxes prior to the redemption 
deadline.110 The property value was assessed at $42,000 at the time of 
foreclosure.111 Clinton County then sold the property at a public auction to a 
bona fide purchaser for $25,500 in June of 2011.112 The debtor filed for 
bankruptcy on December 20, 2011.113 The trustee commenced the adversary 
proceeding on June 28, 2012 seeking a judgment against Clinton County 
declaring the tax foreclosure transfer to be fraudulent and avoiding the transfer 
for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).114  
Clinton County argued that the tax foreclosure proceeding cannot be 
avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).115 Clinton County further argued 
that allowing tax sales to be avoided would “impinge[] upon a municipality’s 
right to collect unpaid real property taxes through foreclosure actions.”116 
Instead, the court in Wolinsky reasoned that BFP should not apply to tax sales.117 
The court stated that, in BFP, the United States Supreme Court refrained from 
extending its holding to other foreclosures and forced sales, including tax sales 
as an example.118 Additionally, the court in Wolinsky stated that other federal 
courts in New York have specifically refused to extend BFP to tax sales because, 
according to these courts, mortgage and in rem tax foreclosures are substantially 
different, and these differences justify differing treatment pursuant to § 548.119  
 
 108. Id. at 234. 
 109. Clinton Cty. Treasurer v. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. 34, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 36. 
 115. Id. at 37. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 39. 
 118. Id. at 38. 
 119. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 38. 
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In Wolinsky, the court also reasoned that the language in § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code suggests tax sales can be avoided because the statute states 
that “any transfer” that occurred within two years prior to the bankruptcy filing 
date may be avoided if the transfer involved actual or constructive fraud.120 The 
court in Wolinsky stated that, based on this language, there is no indication that 
Congress intended to carve out an exception for tax sales.121 The court also 
reasoned that permitting avoidance of tax sales “comports with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s general policy favoring equal treatment of creditors.”122 Therefore, the 
court in Wolinsky concluded that § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “permits the 
Trustee to avoid ‘any transfer’—including a valid state tax foreclosure 
proceeding—that occurred within two years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition and involved actual or constructive fraud.”123 
3. Second Circuit: In re Wentworth. 
In In re Wentworth, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Connecticut considered “whether a non-judicial strict foreclosure of a town tax 
lien conducted pursuant to a state law may constitute an avoidable fraudulent 
transfer under Bankruptcy Code § 548 where there is a one to thirteen ratio 
between the amount of the tax lien and the value of the property.”124 In 
Wentworth, the Town of Acton, Maine filed a tax lien and then obtained title 
through the forfeiture procedure to the debtor’s property in Acton prior to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing date.125 The plaintiff claimed that Acton’s foreclosure 
of its tax lien, when the debtor was insolvent, was an avoidable transfer pursuant 
to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “because the debtor received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.”126 The defendant 
contended that the transfer of property cannot be avoided because the debtor 
received “reasonably equivalent value” through the tax foreclosure 
proceeding.127  
Furthermore, the defendant in Wentworth argued that under BFP, the 
defendant’s forfeiture procedure provided “reasonably equivalent value.”128 The 
court stated that in BFP, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
consideration received from a noncollusive mortgage foreclosure sale that 
conforms to applicable state law is “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 
 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 39 (citing Cty. of Clinton v. Warehouse at Van Buren St., Inc., 496 B.R. 278, 283 
n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
 123. Id. at 41. 
 124. In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 317 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 318. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 319. 
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548 of the Bankruptcy Code, and emphasized that this decision covered only 
mortgage foreclosure sales.129 Further, the Court in BFP stated that the 
considerations may be different in the context of other foreclosures and forced 
sales, including tax sales.130 In Wentworth, the defendant argued that in a 
“reasonably equivalent value” analysis, market value is irrelevant and 
equivalence must be measured by compliance with state mandated 
procedures.131 The court in Wentworth stated that 
[t]he cases that have extended BFP to tax foreclosure sales have generally 
compared the protections offered to the property owner under the state’s 
mortgage foreclosure and tax foreclosure statutes and found that the property 
owner is at least as well protected in a tax foreclosure proceeding as in a 
mortgage foreclosure.132 
Moreover, in Wentworth, the court stated “[t]he rationale of the cases 
extending BFP to tax foreclosure sales does not apply to the instant matter 
because under Maine’s forfeiture procedure for foreclosure of tax liens, the 
property was transferred without the possibility of judicial oversight, without 
competitive bidding, and without a public sale.”133 The court in Wentworth 
distinguished Maine’s forfeiture procedure at issue in that case from mortgage 
foreclosure sales and other tax foreclosure sales, such as the ones in the cases 
that extended BFP to tax foreclosure sales, stating that Maine’s forfeiture 
procedure eliminates the market while mortgage foreclosure sales and the other 
tax foreclosure sales only redefine the market.134 Further, the court stated, 
“[w]hile the forced sale price may be legitimate evidence of the property’s value, 
the amount of a tax lien is no evidence whatsoever of the property’s value.”135 
Therefore, the court in Wentworth “conclude[d] that the transfer of a debtor’s 
real property with a market value of $20,700 for a tax lien of $1,515.63, pursuant 
to the forfeiture procedure, is not for reasonably equivalent value,” and, 
“[c]onsequently, the transfer is a fraudulent transfer pursuant to § 548.”136 
VII.  THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE LACK OF A UNIVERSALLY 
APPLIED STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER TAX SALES ARE FOR 
“REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE” 
The lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether tax sales are 
for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the 
 
 129. Wentworth, 221 B.R. at 319. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 319–20. 
 134. Wentworth, 221 B.R. at 320. 
 135. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 136. Id. 
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Bankruptcy Code causes uncertainty and other negative effects. Allowing tax 
sales to be considered not for “reasonably equivalent value,” and as a result, 
avoidable, “impinges upon a municipality’s right to collect unpaid real property 
taxes through foreclosure actions.”137 Additionally, allowing tax sales to be 
avoidable could “always result in real property tax foreclosures [being] set aside 
because [i]nvariably, there will always be a significant disparity between the 
amount of taxes due and [the] value of the property itself.”138 Providing that tax 
sales may be avoided significantly harms the tax sale market by making it risky 
to acquire property through tax sales. Individuals and entities may stop 
attempting to acquire property through tax sales because of the threat that 
purchasers could lose their investment if the tax sale is avoided in bankruptcy. 
This, as mentioned earlier, may make it difficult for municipalities to collect 
unpaid property taxes through tax sales, which is a significant state interest.139  
Moreover, it is unjust to take property away from good faith purchasers who 
acquire property through tax sales. These good faith purchasers are acquiring 
property through tax sales administered and controlled by state and local 
governments, and have no reason to suspect that their purchase may be 
“constructively fraudulent” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The fact 
that these purchasers are acquiring property from state and local governments 
should arguably increase tax sale purchasers’ confidence in the security of the 
titles to real estate purchased at tax sales. Therefore, avoiding tax sales unjustly 
and unpredictably harms innocent acquirers of property through tax sales. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court recognized the negative 
effects and issues that would be caused by holding that mortgage foreclosure 
sales controlled by state law are avoidable in BFP, stating 
Federal statutes impinging upon important state interests cannot . . . be construed 
without regard to the implications of our dual system of government . . . When 
the Federal Government takes over . . . local radiations in the vast network of 
our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of 
state and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating must be 
reasonably explicit. It is beyond question that an essential state interest is at issue 
here: We have said that the general welfare of society is involved in the security 
of the titles to real estate and the power to ensure that security inheres in the very 
nature of state government. Nor is there any doubt that the interpretation urged 
by petitioner [that the mortgage foreclosure at issue should be deemed not for 
“reasonably equivalent value,” and as a result, avoidable] would have a profound 
effect upon that interest: The title of every piece of realty purchased at 
foreclosure would be under a federally created cloud . . . To displace traditional 
state regulation in such a manner, the federal statutory purpose must be clear and 
 
 137. Clinton Cty. Treasurer v. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. 34, 37 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 138. Cty. of Clinton v. Warehouse at Van Buren St., Inc., 496 B.R. 278, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 37. 
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manifest. Otherwise, the Bankruptcy Code will be construed to adopt, rather 
than to displace, pre-existing state law.140 
These same interests and issues exist equally in the context of tax sales 
controlled by state law. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code should be construed 
to adopt pre-existing state law controlling tax sales because the federal statutory 
purpose of avoiding tax sales is not clear and manifest, which is required to 
displace traditional state regulation. Therefore, the courts should similarly find 
that a fair and proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for foreclosed 
property, including property foreclosed at tax sales, is the price in fact received 
at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the state’s foreclosure 
law have been complied with, precluding avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.141 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court stated in the above quoted 
text from BFP that the general welfare of society is involved in the security of 
the titles to real estate, and the Court stated this is an essential interest of 
states.142 Further, the Court continued, providing that the states have the power 
to ensure the security of the titles to real estate.143 The Court acknowledged that 
allowing mortgage foreclosure sales to be avoided would profoundly affect that 
state interest by placing property purchased at mortgage foreclosure sales 
governed by state law “under a federally created cloud.”144 The same interests 
and issues exist with respect to tax sales. This Note argues that allowing tax sales 
to be avoided harms the general welfare of society and states’ interests by 
significantly reducing the security of the titles to real estate obtained through 
lawfully conducted tax sales. Specifically, by avoiding tax sales, the federal 
government is taking property away from good faith acquirers of property, and 
not allowing the states to ensure the security of the titles to property transferred 
through tax sales. Further, the federal government is disregarding state laws 
governing tax sales when it deems property acquired through tax sales 
“constructively fraudulent” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Avoiding 
tax sales is a displacement of traditional state regulation, and this Note argues 
this is federal government overreach, and it harms the general welfare of society 
and states’ interests by significantly reducing the security of the titles to real 
estate obtained through tax sales. 
 
 140. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544–45 (1994) (internal citations, alterations, 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 141. See id. at 545. 
 142. Id. at 544. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
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VIII.  SOLUTION: SHOULD BFP APPLY TO TAX SALES? 
An ideal solution to resolve the issue of whether tax sales may be avoided 
pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code is to apply BFP to tax sales. In BFP, 
the United States Supreme Court “expressly noted that BFP did not apply to tax 
foreclosures,” and this has created confusion surrounding the issue of whether 
tax sales may be avoided pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.145 In BFP, 
the Court stated in a footnote that “[w]e emphasize that our opinion today covers 
only mortgage foreclosures of real estate. The considerations bearing upon other 
foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be 
different.”146 It is important to highlight that the Court stated the considerations 
may be different.147 This does not mean that the Court would have ruled 
differently if BFP involved a tax sale, only that it could have ruled differently.148 
The Court has not ruled on this issue with respect to tax sales, however, and thus 
the issue remains unresolved. 
This Note argues that the differences between tax sales and mortgage 
foreclosure sales do not justify treating these sales differently when considering 
whether the sales yield “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. In In re McGrath, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New Jersey provided reasoning for why BFP should apply “with as 
much force” in the context of tax sales as it does in mortgage foreclosure sales.149 
While some courts have disagreed with this decision, this Note argues the 
reasoning and holding in McGrath is correct. The court in McGrath reasoned 
that “[a] tax foreclosure is as much a forced sale process as a mortgage 
foreclosure.”150 Further, “the policy considerations favoring deference to 
mortgage foreclosure sales apply with as much force to tax foreclosure sales.”151  
Additionally,  
[t]he holding in BFP, that reasonably equivalent value for foreclosed property is 
the price received at a non-collusive foreclosure sale, is based in large part upon 
the premise that “‘the general welfare of society is involved in the security of 
the titles to real estate’ and the power to ensure that security ‘inheres in the very 
nature of [state] government.’”152 
The Court continued, “not[ing] that foreclosure laws vary from state to state 
based upon how each state values the interests of creditors and debtors, and 
 
 145. Gregg, supra note 41. 
 146. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537 n.3 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78, 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994). 
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setting a federal ‘reasonable’ foreclosure price would place ‘federal bankruptcy 
law well beyond the traditional field of fraudulent transfers.’”153 The Court 
avoided placing “the title of property purchased at foreclosure under a ‘federally 
created cloud,’” holding “that reasonably equivalent value was the price paid at 
a foreclosure sale provided that all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure 
law have been complied with.”154  
The court in McGrath then conceded that tax sales will likely yield lower 
sale prices than mortgage foreclosures “because the amount of taxes due is 
usually much less than the amount due on a mortgage.”155 As a result, “[the] 
difference between the fair market value and the forced sale price is going to be 
greater with a tax foreclosure than with a mortgage foreclosure.”156 BFP states 
that fair market value is not the value to consider in a forced sale context, and 
the McGrath court stated this should be true for tax sales also.157 Further, 
pursuant to New Jersey state law, a tax sale foreclosure is not a fraudulent 
transfer.158 The McGrath court reasoned that  
[w]hile the state statutes do not determine whether a transfer is avoidable under 
Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2), . . . this confirms the concern expressed in BFP 
that the federal courts should not interpret bankruptcy law as to fraudulent 
transfers in a manner which differs from state law absent a clear expression of 
Congressional intention that the federal courts should do so.159 
Therefore, in McGrath, the court ultimately concluded “that the reasoning 
of BFP applies with as much force to tax foreclosures in New Jersey as it does 
to mortgage foreclosures,” and that the price paid for the tax sale certificate in 
that case was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtors’ interest in the 
property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548.160  
This Note disagrees with the courts that have held that BFP should not apply 
in the tax sale context, and that the tax sales in question were not for “reasonably 
equivalent value.” These courts are incorrectly comparing the price received at 
tax sales to the fair market values of properties to determine if tax sales were for 
“reasonably equivalent value.” This is in contrast to the United States Supreme 
Court’s reasoning provided in BFP that courts should not “refer to fair market 
value as the benchmark against which determination of reasonably equivalent 
value is to be measured. In the context of an otherwise lawful mortgage 
foreclosure sale of real estate, such reference is in our opinion not consistent 
 
 153. McGrath, 170 B.R. at 82 (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 540). 
 154. Id. (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 544). 
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with the text of the Bankruptcy Code.”161 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court 
provided that  
we decline to read the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in § 548(a)(2) to 
mean, in its application to mortgage foreclosure sales, either “fair market value” 
or “fair foreclosure price” (whether calculated as a percentage of fair market 
value or otherwise). We deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and 
proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for foreclosed property, is the 
price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of 
the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.162 
Again, in BFP, the Court restricted this holding to mortgage foreclosures.163  
This Note argues that this reasoning and definition of “reasonably equivalent 
value” should apply to tax sales. It is inappropriate to change the definition of 
the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code 
depending on the circumstances because this creates uncertainty and unevenly 
applied law. Additionally, the distinction between tax sales and mortgage 
foreclosure sales is not significant enough to use different definitions of the 
phrase “reasonably equivalent value” for tax sales as compared to mortgage 
foreclosure sales. They are both forced sales, and will likely yield lower prices 
than fair market value, however, the Court in BFP reasoned that fair market 
value is irrelevant when considering whether a mortgage foreclosure sale is for 
“reasonably equivalent value.”164 Therefore, fair market value should be 
irrelevant when considering whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent 
value.” Furthermore, the protections offered to property owners in mortgage 
foreclosure sales and tax sales are comparable and generally “the property owner 
is at least as well protected in a tax foreclosure proceeding as in a mortgage 
foreclosure.”165 Moreover, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri, for example, applied BFP to Missouri tax sales, and 
responded to the fair market value issue stating 
[t]he Court is sensitive to the fact that most, if not all, forced tax sales yield a 
purchase price much lower than the “fair market value” of the property. The 
Supreme Court also recognized this fact in the mortgage foreclosure context, yet 
it did not control their analysis. Similarly, the consideration received at a tax sale 
should not control the analysis in this case.166 
 
 161. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1994). 
 162. Id. at 545. 
 163. Id. at 537 n.3. 
 164. Id. at 536–37. 
 165. In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 319 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). 
 166. In re Russell-Polk, 200 B.R. 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996) (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 
538–39). 
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BFP should apply to tax sales, and as a result, there should be a presumption that 
lawfully conducted tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding 
avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Therefore, similar to the court in McGrath, this Note argues that BFP should 
apply to tax sales.167 “Tax foreclosure sale statutes are often comparable to 
mortgage foreclosure sale statutes,” and as a result, “by analogy, BFP is 
arguably applicable to tax foreclosure sales.”168 Further, the considerations in 
BFP involving mortgage foreclosures are analogous to the considerations 
involving tax sales. Just as the courts in interpreting § 548 of the Bankruptcy 
Code are required to defer to state law governing mortgage foreclosure sales 
pursuant to BFP,169 the courts in interpreting § 548 should be required to defer 
to state law governing tax sales. Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in 
BFP, a “reasonably equivalent value” for property is the price in fact received 
at the forced sale, including tax sales, so long as all the requirements of the 
state’s forced sale laws have been complied with.170 
IX.  SOLUTION: ADOPTING A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PRICE RECEIVED AT A 
TAX SALE PROVIDES FOR “REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE” BASED ON 
FOUR ELEMENTS 
“In reliance on the BFP holding, some courts have found that the price 
received through a tax sale provides for reasonably equivalent value where three 
procedural protections are present: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure and 
strict adherence to statutory requirements.”171 Further, “[t]hese courts generally 
view BFP as instructing that federal courts should not interpret bankruptcy’s 
fraudulent-transfer provisions in a manner that differs from state law, absent a 
clear expression of congressional intent.”172 States generally hold that tax sales 
are not subject to their fraudulent conveyance statutes, and as a result, 
bankruptcy courts using the fraudulent-conveyance provisions of § 548 should 
not reach a different result.173 These courts reason that “what is a reasonable 
price under the provisions of the state statute providing for the forced sale should 
be deemed reasonably equivalent value under § 548.”174 Moreover, “[t]his 
method provides tax sales in each state the same protections, and only sales that 
do not comply with a state’s statutory requirements may be set aside.”175 
 
 167. In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78, 83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994). 
 168. Gregg, supra note 41. 
 169. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545. 
 170. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 171. Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63. 
 172. Id. 
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 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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“Other courts require a fourth element: the need for competitive bidding.”176 
Adding this fourth element creates the potential of differing results depending 
on the provisions of the state statute authorizing the sale in question.177 The 
courts requiring the fourth element still rely on BFP.178 In BFP, the United 
States Supreme Court noted that not all forced sales pursuant to state law would 
be deemed to be for a “reasonably equivalent value.”179  
These courts look to the facts of BFP, recognizing that the state procedure in 
question, as noted by the Supreme Court, provided for competitive bidding. The 
bidding allows for a market to establish the value—a value not necessarily 
related in any way to “fair market value,” but for a “reasonably equivalent value” 
to the debtor’s interest under the circumstances of the forced sale.180 
This Note agrees with the courts that have found that the price received 
through a tax sale provides for “reasonably equivalent value” where the 
following four procedural protections are present: notice, reasonable opportunity 
to cure, strict adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding.181 
This approach is ideal because it addresses the negative effects caused by the 
uncertainty under the current system while ensuring that bankruptcy estates 
receive a fair value because a tax sale meeting the aforementioned four elements 
will likely yield a fair value. Further, adopting this presumption could provide 
an additional incentive for states to amend their tax sale procedures to meet the 
elements required to establish “reasonably equivalent value” in tax sales. This 
could benefit states because their tax sales would presumably yield higher values 
if the tax sales meet the aforementioned elements.  
Therefore, as some courts have recognized, an ideal solution to address the 
negative effects caused by the lack of a universally applied standard to determine 
whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is for the courts to adopt a universally applied presumption 
that tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question 
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict 
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. This solution 
addresses the negative effects caused by the uncertainty under the current system 
while still ensuring that a fair value is received by the bankruptcy estate to be 
distributed among creditors of the estate, fulfilling the bankruptcy courts’ 
mission of “ensuring equal treatment for both debtors and creditors.”182 
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X.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, there is no universally applied standard to determine whether tax 
sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. As a result, it remains uncertain and difficult to predict whether tax sales 
may or may not be avoided because tax sales may be avoided if they are not for 
“reasonably equivalent value.” This uncertainty has numerous negative effects, 
including causing harm to the general welfare of society and states’ interests by 
significantly reducing the security of the titles to real estate obtained through tax 
sales.183 One solution to address this issue is to apply BFP to tax sales. 
Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in BFP, a “reasonably equivalent 
value” for property is the price in fact received at forced sales, including tax 
sales, so long as all the requirements of the state’s forced sale laws have been 
complied with.184 Another solution is for the courts to adopt a presumption that 
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question 
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict 
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. One of these 
solutions is necessary to remove the titles of property purchased at tax sales from 
under the current “federally created cloud.”185 
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